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Abstract
The Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 (CESA-12) was introduced to reduce carbon diox-
ide (CO2) emissions and promote the use of renewable energy in the electricity sector.
The legislation contains two separate policy mechanisms to achieve its goals: a genera-
tion requirement that speciﬁed technology distributions, and a carbon emission intensity
requirement. The carbon intensity aspect of the bill is a novel approach for addressing car-
bon emissions produced from electricity generation, though similar schemes have already
been implemented in the transportation sector. This paper ﬁnds that the bill acts as a
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) for the ﬁrst ten years of its life, and then acts as
a hybrid RPS-carbon intensity standard for the remainder, based on current generation
distribution projections. When the carbon intensity requirements are isolated using his-
torical data, CESA-12 generally reduces carbon emissions, though does so at the cost of
simultaneously reducing social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Electricity is the most carbon-intensive economic segment in the United States. In 2010,
the industry emitted approximately 2.30 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2), ac-
counting for 33% of all U.S. carbon emissions (EPA, 2012a). The production of electricity
via the burning of fossil fuels emits greenhouse gases, which have been widely implicated
in anthropogenic climate change. While numerous technologies exist that could mini-
mize greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production, many of them are still in their
technological adolescence, rendering them economically infeasible. Further, the increasing
public concern about climate change is making comprehensive emissions bills much more
politically attractive; therefore, such policies warrant thorough examination. Academic
papers have attempted to study the eﬀects of Cap and Trade, Renewable Portfolio Stan-
dards, Feed-in Tariﬀs, and various other policies under numerous political, economic, and
environmental scenarios.
This thesis will evaluate the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 (CESA-12), which is
a new and unique type of policy for the electricity sector. CESA-12 was introduced to
promote clean and renewable energy sources for electricity production, thereby reducing
the amount of emitted greenhouse gases. This paper will determine CESA-12￿s eﬀects
on carbon emissions, generation source allocation, and electricity price. Since academic
studies have not yet addressed this legislation, this paper will contribute its ﬁndings to the
general literature on climate and energy legislation, and will help to inform future policy.
4
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The bill, if made into law, would go into eﬀect in 2015 and would aﬀect most electric
utilities. CESA-12 attempts to minimize the carbon intensity of newly installed generation
facilities by creating a carbon credit system. CESA-12￿s regulation mechanism requires
that percentages of the electricity supplied by utilities come from sources below a speciﬁed
carbon intensity. The policy awards credits to producers that meet or exceed that goal.
These credits are both tradable (can be exchanged amongst electric utilities) and bankable
(they can be used in later years). The amount of electricity from these sources increases
from 24% in 2015 to 84% in 2035. See Table 1. Small electricity retailers are exempted from
meeting carbon requirements if they produce less than a deﬁned quantity of electricity; this
quantity decreases from 2 million megawatt hours (MWh) in 2015 to 1 million MWhs in
2035.
This bill deﬁnes the following as ￿￿clean generation sources￿￿ and awards credits for each
MWh of energy produced: qualiﬁed renewable biomass, municipal solid waste, qualiﬁed
waste-to-energy, and landﬁll gas. Renewable energy is further deﬁned as electricity from
solar, wind, ocean, current, wave, tidal, or geothermal sources. Electricity from hydro-
electric and nuclear sources are also eligible for credits if they were placed into service,
or experienced qualiﬁed capacity additions, after December 31, 1991. If hydroelectric or
nuclear sources were installed prior to 1992, their capacities can be subtracted from the
total electricity the utility must consider.
This paper will detail the structural background of various existing energy policies,
with a comparison to CESA-12￿s structure. The mathematical details of CESA-12 will be
5
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further deﬁned in Section 4.
2 Policy Background
This section describes common policies intended to curb greenhouse gas emissions and
promote renewable energy generation.
2.1 Cap and Trade
Cap-and-trade (CAT) systems are perhaps the most recognizable of these programs. In
general, CAT deﬁnes a maximum allowable quantity of greenhouse gas emissions and allows
for the trading of any unused emissions allowances by a regulated entity. CAT systems
allow for a more eﬃcient distribution of emissions reductions by allowing ﬁrms with very
high abatement costs to purchase credits, and by allowing ﬁrms with low abatement costs to
sell them. Such incentives motivate ﬁrms that have the capability to increase technological
innovation since permits from further reduced emissions can still be traded in the market
(Ellerman, et al., 2003). Ellerman, et al. (2003) examined six national and regional US
CAT systems for non-carbon emissions and found that CAT systems generally improve
environmental outcomes and lower the cost of meeting emissions goals. For example, the
authors conclude that the EPA imposed Acid Rain Trading program, which imposed a cap
on SO2, reduced the cost of abatement by approximately 50% compared to other programs
with similar emissions targets.
6
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The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest currently-
active CAT in the world. Implemented in 2005, the EU ETS is a classic cap and trade
system, and will operate in three separate phases (Perdan and Azapagic, 2011). Each stage
reduces the emissions cap and increases the types of regulated pollutants and industries. For
example, Phase II, operated between 2008 and 2012, mandates that ﬁrms in the electricity,
metal reﬁning, cement, glass, ceramic, pulp and paper industries reduce CO2 and nitric
acid emissions below 2005 levels. Phase III, which will be enacted between 2013 and
2020, requires a 21% decrease of Phase II pollutants plus perﬂuorocarbons (PFCs) below
2005 levels. Phase III also regulates the petrochemical, aviation, aluminum, and ammonia
industries.
Compared to other programs aimed at reducing emissions, CAT is generally considered
the most economically eﬀective (Stavins, 2008). However, there are still costs associated
with these reductions. Paltsev, et al. (2007) found that welfare costs for reductions in a
generalized carbon CAT scheme range from net-zero to 2.0%. It is important to note that
Paltsev et al., did not model an extant proposed CAT bill, but rather projected a broad
range of possible CAT parameters.
CESA-12 diﬀers from a CAT policy in two ways. First, CESA-12 sets maximum carbon
intensities based on actual energy generation instead of a total carbon cap independent of
generation, which would be expected in a CAT paradigm. This mechanism allows for
greater net carbon emissions in years when demand is greater. Second, CESA-12 requires
minimum amounts of clean energy to be employed by electricity retailers; the structure is
7
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similar to that of a Renewable Portfolio Standard.
2.2 Renewable Portfolio Standards
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are another type of policy intended to increase re-
newable or low carbon technology, often as a means of reducing emissions. RPS requires
that explicit proportions of a utility’s generation come from speciﬁed technologies such as
wind, solar, or combined heat and power (Logan, et al., 2009). Thirty states currently
have an RPS in place, though the technology requirements vary widely. The European
Union enacted the Renewables Directive in 2001 which functions similarly to an RPS by
requiring 22% of electricity to come from renewables by 2020.
Palmer and Burtraw (2005) utilized numerical simulation models to analyze the eco-
nomic eﬃciencies of various RPS programs. Using the Haiku electricity market model,
the authors estimate the eﬀects of a 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% RPS on major pollutants
such as NOx, SOx, CO2, and mercury. The paper compares the RPS to the United States
Renewable Energy Production Credit (REPC). Initially implemented in 1992, REPC im-
plemented a $0.015 per kilowatt hour (kWh) tax credit for wind and carbon neutral biomass
generation. The program was modiﬁed multiple times in the early 2000s to account for
inﬂation and include other sources of renewable generation. The authors were also able to
determine that the RPS has varying economic and environmental eﬀects depending on the
required renewable percentage. Of speciﬁc interest is the non-linear increase in electricity
price, which ranges from an increase of less than 1% in the 5% RPS to 8.5% in the 20%
8
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RPS. The nonlinearity of price increase is caused mainly by the change in generation mix
composition, with the 20% requiring large investments in renewables, which cost more than
traditional coal and natural gas generation. It is likely that CESA-12 will have a similarly
non-linear electricity price change as carbon intensity decreases during the duration of the
program.
While CESA-12 and an RPS both require speciﬁc technologies to be used in meeting
emissions goals, CESA-12 does not stipulate the allocation of each technology as in an
RPS. Instead, CESA-12 indicates that a certain percentage of a utility￿s generation must
come from a group of technologies.
2.3 Feed-in Tariﬀs
Feed-in Tariﬀ (FiT) programs are designed speciﬁcally to increase the prevalence of indi-
vidual energy technologies. Such strategies compel electricity retailers to utilize generation
from speciﬁc technologies; tariﬀs set by the government on these energy imports are usually
established above market price to increase price competition of these otherwise economi-
cally ineﬃcient technologies (Ringel, 2005).
The German FiT legislation is perhaps the most widely known, and had the most
eﬀect on wind power penetration, but also applies to solar technologies. Germany￿s FiT
law was initially passed in 1990, but did not take its current form until 2000 when the
German parliament passed the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG). The initial policy
created a marginal cost subsidy where electric utilities were required to pay the wind
9
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power producers 90% of the end-use price of the electricity. When the EEG was enacted,
it guaranteed consistent tariﬀs of 9.1c/kWh for the ﬁrst ﬁve years, and 6.19c/kWh for the
next ﬁfteen years.
There has been debate of the eﬀectiveness of the programs. Butler and Neuhoﬀ (2008)
examine the German experience with utilizing FiTs to increase wind and solar power de-
ployment. They observe that the scheme does not expose electricity producers to price
competition, and is therefore technically ineﬃcient. However, Butler and Neuhoﬀ note
that the technological limitations of any technology can create other types of competition.
With wind power, for example, certain geographical regions such as coastal areas generally
have more consistent wind and stronger gusts. Land to develop in these areas is limited
though, so development companies must compete to purchase the rights to use those coastal
locations.
Frondel, et al. (2010) found that these tariﬀs have a net cost between e 11 billion and
e 22 billion for wind, and upwards of e 65 billion for solar photovoltaic, depending on model
assumptions. Utilizing these costs, the authors suggest that FiTs are ineﬃcient means for
CO2 abatement, in some cases costing more than e 716 per metric tonne. Frondel, et
al., also suggest that long-term net growth may actually be negative, since renewable
generation installation have lower labor intensities than traditional forms of generation.
Despite the general ineﬃciency of FiTs, they have worked very well in Germany￿s case.
Yearly generation has increased from approximately 50,000 GWh in 1990 to more than
300,000 GWh in 2011 (Bohme, 2012).
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CESA-12 policy mechanisms are fundamentally diﬀerent than FiT mechanisms since
CESA-12 does not mandate payment structures between utilities and producers.
2.4 Direct Taxes
Pigouvian taxes in the energy industry attempt to mitigate the detrimental environmental
eﬀects of emissions produced during electricity generation. The tax is applied to either
fuel sources (e.g. a tax on buying coal) or directly to emissions (e.g. on each ton of carbon
emitted). The taxes attempt to internalize negative externalities by incorporating the cost
of environmental damage into the price of electricity production. Demand and supply
elasticities determine the proportion that producers and consumers pay for the carbon
abatement.
Taxes tend to be economically eﬃcient since they not only provide incentive to reduce
emissions or adopt cleaner technology (and therefore reduce emission), but they encourage
producers to reduce emissions as much as possible. Furthermore, the revenue raised from
these taxes can be recycled back into the economy to minimize the impact of increased
costs and prices on producers and consumers, respectively. In contrast, CAT policies only
require carbon abatement to a speciﬁed emissions quantity. Below this emissions level,
ﬁrms are no longer required to reduce carbon output. Should the CAT cap be set at an
incorrect level, the policy may not be binding or may set carbon emissions too low. In
either case, total welfare would be reduced and dynamic equilibrium would not be reached
since the total abatement costs would not equal the total environmental damage costs.
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Few national governments have implemented carbon taxes since they are politically
unpopular. New Zealand, however, has implemented a NZ$25 tax per tonne of emitted
carbon dioxide. Creedy and Sleeman (2006) ﬁnd that the welfare burden is minimal on
consumers, resulting in an eﬀective tax rate of approximately 2.75% on residential fuel and
power.
While CESA-12 is not a tax directly on generation sources, the results of this paper
suggest that CESA-12 does function similarly. As discussed in Section 5, CESA-12 imposes
a wedge similar to that of a tax by penalizing utilities that cannot meet emission rate
requirements, and rewarding those that can.
2.5 Low Carbon Fuel Standards
Another policy that has recently been implemented is California￿s Low Carbon Fuel Stan-
dard (LCFS). The LCFS aims to regulate transportation sector fuels, and in many ways,
CESA-12 is the electricity-sector equivalent of this type of policy. The California LCFS
operates by regulating the carbon intensity of transportation fuel sources, though it makes
no speciﬁcation on the types of fuels that must be used.
Holland, Knittel, and Hughes (2007) analyze the California LCFS by comparing the
current distribution of gasoline and ethanol for transportation fuel. In general, they ﬁnd
that the policy decreases carbon emissions, but comes at the price of reducing total private
surplus. Emissions reductions may come at a higher cost compared to CAT with similar
levels of abatement. This is because LCFS implicitly tax ”dirty” fuels while subsidizing
12
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”clean” fuels.
CESA-12 and the LCFS have very similar economic devises. Both polices seek to reduce
total carbon emissions by regulating the carbon intensity of energy sources and allow for
dynamic emissions levels based on demand. The authors also ﬁnd that an LCFS can
only achieve the eﬃcient allocation of energy production and emissions when the carbon
intensity of the fuels is zero. This outcome is particularly applicable to modeling CESA-
12 because electricity generation does utilize carbon-free energy sources. Whether or not
that outcome will be reached depends on whether the carbon intensity required by the
legislation is lower than the carbon intensity of the lowest non-zero energy source. Unlike
CESA-12, the California LCFS does not have increasing requirements for the percentage
of low carbon fuels produced.
3 Energy Production
To understand the impacts of CESA-12, a model must be constructed which incorporates
its relevant economic, energy, and environmental features. This model will consider all the
electricity generation fuels mentioned in the bill, and can be expanded to include additional
technologies. Speciﬁcally, this paper will describe a single, price-taking ﬁrm participating
in an open and free market that is subject to the CESA-12 constraints. The ﬁrm has
the option, but not the requirement, to produce electricity via all available technologies.
Furthermore, this paper assumes that there are no costs associated with trading the CESA-
13
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12 credits. In the case of costless trading, asymmetric ﬁrms and a single representative
ﬁrm are equivalent.
Production costs, Ci(qi), for each energy source are assumed to be increasing and
convex, such that Ci0 > 0 and Ci00 > 0. The energy sources will be broken up into
high, low, and zero carbon emissions categories with emissions rates of i. High emissions
sources comprise coal and petroleum; low emissions sources comprise natural gas; zero
emissions sources are those categorized as clean by CESA-12 and include the zero carbon
energy sources, such as wind, solar, geothermal, combined heat and power (CHP), biomass,
and waste-to-energy.1 It should be noted that the zero carbon energy sources have a
carbon emissions rate of Zi = 0. Let each unit of carbon do  dollars of damage, so that
environmental damage from each source i is calculated as iqi.
The beneﬁt of electricity consumption is U(qH ; qL; qZ1 ; qZ2 :::qZj ) where qZj represents
the j th zero carbon energy source, and with U increasing and concave. This general
function encompasses consumer surplus and allows for varying assumptions about the sub-
stitutability of energy sources. Furthermore, calculating the marginal utility of the source,
e.g. the partial derivative, can capture demand for each energy source.
1Though CHP, biomass, and waste-to-energy all produce CO2, generation from these technologies is
treated as a special category. Details are outlined in Section 4.
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3.1 Proﬁt Maximization without CESA-12
Utilizing the following maximization problem, the eﬃcient energy production and con-
sumption, as well as carbon emissions can be determined:
max
qH ; qL; qZj
(PiQi)  CH(qH)  CL(qL)  CZj (qZj ) (1)
where R = PiQi and
qZj = qZwind +qZspv +qZst +qZgeo +
qZbio +qZCHP +qZwte (2)
where wind represents wind energy, both on- and oﬀ-shore, spv represents solar photo-
voltaic energy sources, st represents solar thermal energy sources, geo represents geother-
mal energy sources, bio represents biomass energy sources, CHP represents combined heat
and power energy sources, and wte represents waste-to-energy sources.
The ﬁrst order conditions can then be written as:
@U
@qi
= MCi(qi) (3)
where i a member of {H, L, Zi }, and MCi is deﬁned as:
MCi(qi) =
@Ci
@qi
(4)
15
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. Under the assumptions above, equilibrium requires that for each energy source i:
pi = MCi(qi) (5)
However, this equilibrium ignores the marginal social damage i(qi). For any energy
source with a positive carbon intensity, too much energy is produce from that source
because the price of energy does not include the cost of the damages, and is therefore too
low:
pi MCi(qi) + i (6)
Various policies exist to internalize the marginal social damages and CESA-12 is one such
policy.
4 The Clean Energy Standards Act of 2012
In general, the CESA-12 seeks to regulate the carbon intensity of a utility￿s pool of elec-
tricity generation sources. Electricity retailers are required to reduce total electricity gen-
eration carbon intensity below the levels outlined in the bill, or are forced to pay a $30
per MWh alternative compliance payment. The payment increases by 5% per year and is
adjusted for inﬂation.
The bill exempts very small utilities that would otherwise not be able to meet these
requirements by implementing a yearly generation minimum. For example, a utility com-
16
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prised of only coal plants producing less than two million MWhs of electricity in 2015
would not be required to adhere to the carbon intensities imposed in the bill. The mini-
mum generation amount decreases to one million MWhs by 2025. See Table 2. In eﬀect,
this reduces the amount of eligible power producers by 19% (EPA, 2012b).
CESA-12 also stipulates that electricity generated from nuclear and traditional hydro-
electric plants constructed before 1992 is exempt from total carbon intensity calculation.
New nuclear plants and capacity gains represent approximately 2.2% of applicable nuclear
capacity because all but two nuclear plants were built before the deadline (EIA, 1995; EIA
2012a). See Figure 2. Applicable hydroelectric additions amount to approximately 7.0%
percent of current generation capacity (EIA, 1995). See Figure 3. Nuclear and hydroelec-
tric generation capacity is subtracted from a utility￿s total generation capacity, and this
eﬀect is accounted for in the model.
CHP generation receives full credits if the plant generates at least 20% of its energy in
the form of heat or 20% of its energy in the form of electricity, and has an overall eﬃciency of
at least 50%. In The Catalog of CHP Technologies (2008), the EPA utilizes three diﬀerent
methods for calculating CHP eﬃciency methods: Total CHP Eﬃciency, Eﬀective Electrical
Eﬃciency, and the FERC Eﬃciency Standard. CESA-12 does not specify which eﬃciency
calculation to use, and the various calculations can alter the eﬃciency ratings by more
than 10%. However, the EPA takes this variability into consideration and concludes that
all available technologies have a net eﬃciency of greater than 55%. This paper assumes
that all CHP installations also utilize the minimum heat and electricity production.
17
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CESA-12 does not state how biomass credits will be distributed. This paper subtracts
electricity from biomass from total generation.
Electricity generation from coal and natural gas, as well as other carbon producing
sources, may earn partial credits on a per MWh basis, via the following equation:
CESA CreditMWh = 1 
 
Tons CO2
MWh

0:82
(7)
These credits must equal or exceed the total number of MWhs produced by the utility in
a given year. If the utility is unable to meet these requirements, they are forced to submit
alternative compliance payments. This calculation applies to electricity generated from
carbon-producing sources such as coal, fuel oil, and natural gas. The crediting equation
therefore emphasizes cleaner technologies because larger partial credits are created from
lower carbon fuels. Furthermore, Equation 7 implies that CESA-12 does not impose an
absolute cap on carbon emissions. Total carbon emissions can adjust to energy demand
because partial credits can be created and are distributed on a per MWh basis.
4.1 Eﬃcient Electricity Production
CESA-12 attempts to internalize the externalities excluded in the equilibrium model in
Section 3.1. Incorporating the marginal social cost into Equation 1, the maximization
18
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problem becomes:
max
qH ; qL; qZj
U(qH ; qL; qZj)  CH(qH)  CL(qL)  CZwind(qZwind) 
CZspv(qZspv)  CZst(qZst)  CZgeo(qZgeo) 
CZbio(qZbio)  CZCHP (qZCHP )  CZwte(qZwte) 
(HqH + LqL + Zj ) (8)
subject to the same deﬁnitions as Equation 1. This can be rewritten as
max
qH ; qL; qZj
U(qH ; qL; qZj)  CH(qH)  CL(qL)  CZwind(qZwind) 
CZspv(qZspv)  CZst(qZst)  CZgeo(qZgeo) 
CZbio(qZbio)  CZCHP (qZCHP )  CZwte(qZwte) 
(HqH + LqL) (9)
because
ZjqZj  0 (10)
which suggests that there are no environmental damages from zero carbon energy sources.
Equation 9 can be solved so that
Pi = MCi + i (11)
19
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for all i. This indicates that every energy source with i > 0 is taxed proportionately to
its carbon emission.
4.2 CESA-12 Constrained Maximization
Under CESA-12, electricity generated by the utility is subject to the following general
constraint:
  HqH + LqL + ZjqZj
qH + qL + qZj
(12)
where  is the carbon intensity standard for a given utility. Using Equation 13, since
ZjqZj necessarily equal to zero, the Equation 14 simpliﬁes to:
  HqH + LqL
qH + qL + qZj
(13)
implying that only carbon-producing generation is negatively impacted by this constraint.2
The constraint can be rewritten as:
HqH + LqL   (qH + qL + qZj)  0 (14)
where qZi is deﬁned in Equation 2.
Combining the constraint in Equation 13 with the Equation 1, the Lagrangian expres-
2Further, this constraint is not binding if  > H .
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sion for the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization becomes:
L
0@ max
qH ; qL; qZj
1A = pHqH + pLqL + pZiqZi   CH(qH)  CL(qL) 
CZwind(qZwind)  CZspv(qZspv)  CZst(qZst) 
CZgeo(qZgeo)  CZbio(qZbio) 
CZCHP (qZCHP )  CZwte(qZwte) +
[(qH + qL + qZi)  HqH   LqL] (15)
where  is the shadow value of the CESA-12 constraint. From Equation 14, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst
order conditions are:
pi = MCi(qi) + (i   ) (16)
where pi is the price of the ith energy source and:
[(qH + qL + qZi)  HqH   LqL] = 0 (17)
where   0. The ﬁrst condition, Equation 15, equates the price of the generation to the
marginal production and opportunity costs under the constraint, and can be rewritten as:
MCi = pi   (i   ) (18)
The second condition, Equation 12, suggests either  = 0 or the constraint binds. can be
interpreted as the price a ﬁrm would be willing to pay for an additional CESA-12 credit.
21
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Moreover,  must be less than CESA-12￿s alternative compliance payment otherwise the
constraint will not be binding. If the  is greater than the alternative compliance, it would
be more cost eﬀective for ﬁrms to make the payment. Together, conditions Equations 16
and 17 deﬁne energy supply. Energy price is determined by:
pi =
@U
@qi
(19)
The result of the carbon intensity constraints is that equilibrium price and supply is now
dependent on i, whereas in unregulated equilibrium, i is ignored.
4.3 Computer Simulation
The details of the computer simulation are outlined in Appendix B. This includes informa-
tion about generation data, carbon emissions, and model functional forms. There is also a
discussion on elasticity issues and assumptions.
5 Results
Simulations were performed for individual years using projected or historical generation
data from the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook (AEO),
with emissions information normalized to 2009 (the most recent available year). Energy
sources are divided into three categories and are modiﬁed based on CESA-12 stipulations
(e.g. only nuclear capacity additions can be counted as clean energy), as described in
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Section 3. Electricity prices are all inﬂation adjusted to 2010 dollars.  is set to 0.82 CO2
per MWh.
All simulation scenarios were run utilizing three diﬀerent elasticity estimate sets, rang-
ing from low to high, based on estimations from the literature (see Tables 3 through 7 and
Appendix B). For example, the lowest price elasticity of supply for high carbon technolo-
gies, zero carbon technologies, and natural gas are all run in the same simulation; likewise,
the average elasticities and high elasticities are run in their own simulations. The lowest
elasticities are expected to have the highest social welfare changes because costs to produce
electricity from energy sources below the carbon intensity requirement are greatest, and
consumer surplus losses are greatest for each MWh of energy not produced. Conversely,
high elasticity estimates should produce the least change in welfare across a given year
estimate. The simulations generally conform to these expectations, with one exception
discussed below
5.1 CESA-12 Legislation Years
CESA-12 clean generation percentage (RPS-like) requirements were excluded during the
initial simulations to isolate the eﬀects of the carbon intensity (LCFS-like) portion of
CESA-12. However, projected baseline scenarios have lower carbon intensities than CESA-
12 requirements until at least 2026. For example, EIA projects that the carbon intensity of
electricity generation across the United States will be 0.6284 tons CO2 per MWh in 2015,
while the carbon intensity in 2035 is projected to be 0.6358 tons CO2 per MWh. During
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the years 2015 through 2025, the CESA-12 intensity standard is therefore non-binding.
To determine the actual eﬀects of the legislation, the generation percentage requirement
was included. However, this constraint also proved to be non-binding with clean generation
making up a greater percentage than the CESA-12 dictated minimum until 2026. During
the 2026 to 2035 time frame, generation requirements were the only binding constraint,
causing CESA-12 to function as a Renewable Portfolio Standard as described in Section
2.2.
The year 2030 (the ﬁrst year of projections from the AEO after 2026) was simulated
using the model, and the results are documented in Table 3. As expected, the policy
behaved like an RPS because the carbon intensity constraint was non-binding. Eﬀects
across the elasticity range behaved as predicted with greater negative impacts on total
surplus at lower elasticities. Total carbon emissions decreased by more than 300 billion
tons in all elasticity scenarios.
However, Table 3 illustrates an unexpected result. Both the high carbon and zero car-
bon energy sources decrease their share of generation while natural gas generation increases.
This result occurs because natural gas is considered clean energy for purposes of generation
percentage. While natural gas generation is still subject to carbon intensity requirements,
only the RPS-like constraint binds, so natural gas generation increases because it has the
lowest supply elasticity in the clean energy category. Furthermore, the increase in natural
gas generation causes the total carbon intensity to fall because natural gas generation (0.48
CO2 per MWh) is less intense than the initial system in 2030 (0.54 CO2 per MWh). A
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lower relative supply elasticity would cause zero carbon electricity generation to increase.
Producer surplus increases in the 2030 scenario due to the relatively large increase in
natural gas generation.
Generation for the 2035 simulation follows a more typical RPS pattern than 2030. Total
generation decreases by up to 119 million MWh, while total surplus also decreases by up to
$113 billion. In both 2030 and 2035, per MWh electricity costs increase by approximately
$3.00 in the highly elastic scenarios to more than $14.00 in the minimally elastic ones.
The RPS has carbon costs on the high end of the estimations from Tol (2005), who
ﬁnds that median damages from CO2 emissions to be $14 - about half the cost of the most
elastic scenario.
5.2 Isolated Carbon Intensity Mechanism
Historical data with a carbon intensity greater than the CESA-12 requirement was used to
study the eﬀects of the LCFS-type mechanism. The only prior year with complete national
generation data with a carbon intensity greater than 0.82 was 1992, where electricity gen-
eration produced 0.8249 tons CO2 per MWh (EIA, 1995). This data was run through the
simulation model without clean generation percentage requirements.
In Table 5, we see that total generation unexpectedly increases. The theoretical frame-
work laid out in Holland, et al. (2007) provides for this possibility since carbon intensity of
the low carbon energy source is substantially lower (by nearly half) than the requirement;
the presence of zero carbon energy sources ampliﬁes this eﬀect.
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Because total generation increases, price in each scenario decreases (albeit minimally),
and consumer surplus increases as a result. The size and direction of price and surplus
changes adheres to assumptions about elasticities.
Even in the least elastic scenario, carbon costs barely exceed $1.00 per ton CO2 and  is
at most $2.42 per ton CO2. Compared to the RPS mechanism of the CESA-12 legislation,
these values are nearly an order of magnitude lower.
A synthetic year was created to determine if the eﬀects observed in the 1992 historical
data were endogenous to the carbon intensity mechanism. Data from 1992 was altered
such that natural gas and renewable electricity generation were each reduced by one-third.
See Appendix B for details about the creation of this data.
Table 6 outlines the results of the synthetic 1992 data. Initial carbon intensity was
0.90 CO2 per MWh and was reduced to 0.82 CO2 per MWh via the LCFS-like mechanism.
Both high carbon and total generation fell, which was anticipated based on the pre-CESA-
12 carbon intensity. Zero carbon electricity generation had the greatest absolute increases
across all elasticities, though had smaller increases at smaller elasticities. Natural gas
generation also increased slightly.
Meeting this emissions requirement came at a price, with producer, consumer, and total
surpluses all decreasing. However, even in the least elastic scenario, total surplus fell less
than in either the 2030 or 2035 simulations. Compared to the 2030 scenario, the total
carbon in 1992 synthetic simulation reduced carbon by half the amount but reduced total
surplus by an order of magnitude less. The LCFS-like constraint also caused smaller price
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increases and had lower carbon costs than either of the RPS-like scenarios.
Only in the least elastic 1992 synthetic data scenario did ￿s value exceed the 2015
alternative compliance payment of $30 per MWh. Even assuming no inﬂation,  would
be priced lower than the alternative compliance as soon as 2026. It is interesting to note
how quickly  changes in relation to changes in elasticity: when elasticity decreases by
half,  more than doubles. This suggests that the LCFS mechanism as it is structured in
CESA-12 may not be an eﬀective means of reducing carbon emissions if the price elasticity
of supply for energy sources is low.
6 Conclusion and Research Extensions
This paper ﬁnds that CESA-12, as it is currently written, does not impose a binding LCFS-
type mechanism. Instead, energy source deﬁnitions and requirements create an RPS-like
constraint that was non-binding for half of the life of the legislation.
The simulation models draw an interesting comparison between the RPS-type aspects
of CESA-12 and the LCFS-type aspects. In the two simulations in which the carbon
intensity requirements dominate, carbon abatement costs are between four and ten times
lower than generation requirement constraints. This fact suggests that carbon intensity
requirements should be more eﬃcient at reducing carbon emissions than a RPS. Coupled
with the ﬂexibility of LCFS schemes to adjust to economic conditions, carbon intensity
requirements should prove to be an attractive alternative to RPS schemes.
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However, this paper is far from a conclusive study on the eﬀects of an LCFS-type policy
in the electricity industry. Incorporating CAT, FiT, and tax models into these simulations
would allow for direct comparison of various energy policies. The juxtaposition of CO2
reduction mechanisms would be instrumental in informing future policy decisions.
One of the most signiﬁcant limitations of this paper￿s model is its reliance on indirect
parameter estimations from the literature, namely the price elasticity of supply for various
generation sources. A natural extension to this paper would be to explore these elasticities
speciﬁcally in the electricity sector. As noted, these values are not well documented in the
literature, but robust estimates would prove invaluable for future models of this type.
Creating and modeling diﬀerent initial allocations may also prove insightful since such
large surplus variations were seen in the Holland, Knittel, and Hughes (2007) paper. Energy
policies with CESA-12 mechanisms may reduce total social cost or achieve greater eﬃciency
from diﬀerent credit allocations.
Altering the deﬁnitions of ￿clean energy￿ should signiﬁcantly alter the RPS outcome.
For example, excluding natural gas from the required clean energy distribution should
greatly increase the total deployment of zero carbon technologies. Similarly, restricting the
carbon intensity requirement would change the mechanism of carbon emissions reduction.
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A Figures and Tables
Table 1: Minimum clean energy generation percentages as deﬁned by the Clean Energy
Standard Act of 2012.
Calendar
Year
Minimum
Clean Genera-
tion
2015 .................................................... 24%
2016 .................................................... 27%
2017 .................................................... 30%
2018 .................................................... 33%
2019 .................................................... 36%
2020 .................................................... 39%
2021 .................................................... 42%
2022 .................................................... 45%
2023 .................................................... 48%
2024 .................................................... 51%
2025 .................................................... 54%
2026 .................................................... 57%
2027 .................................................... 60%
2028 .................................................... 63%
2029 .................................................... 66%
2030 .................................................... 69%
2031 .................................................... 72%
2032 .................................................... 75%
2033 .................................................... 78%
2034 .................................................... 81%
2035 .................................................... 84%
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Table 2: Minimum annual electricity generation for a utility to be subject to the require-
ments of the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012.
Calendar
Year
Minimum
Generation
2015 .................................................... 2,000,000
2016 .................................................... 1,900,000
2017 .................................................... 1,800,000
2018 .................................................... 1,700,000
2019 .................................................... 1,600,000
2020 .................................................... 1,500,000
2021 .................................................... 1,400,000
2022 .................................................... 1,300,000
2023 .................................................... 1,200,000
2024 .................................................... 1,100,000
2025 .................................................... 1,000,000
2026 .................................................... 1,000,000
2027 .................................................... 1,000,000
2028 .................................................... 1,000,000
2029 .................................................... 1,000,000
2030 .................................................... 1,000,000
2031 .................................................... 1,000,000
2032 .................................................... 1,000,000
2033 .................................................... 1,000,000
2034 .................................................... 1,000,000
2035 .................................................... 1,000,000
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Table 3: Elasticity Scenarios for 2030 Projected Data
2030
Elasticities Low Average High
High Carbon 0.95 1.9 3.8
Natural Gas 0.635 1.27 2.54
Zero Carbon 1.37 2.74 5.48
Generation (M MWh)
Delta High Carbon (614.420) (596.580) (586.840)
Delta Natural Gas 576.600 599.940 609.440
Delta Zero Carbon (81.333) (65.079) (52.790)
Delta Total (119.150) (61.725) (30.197)
Surplus ($m)
Delta Producer $ 13,445.000 $ 7,785.000 $ 3,680.200
Delta Consumer $ (54,459.000) $ (27,263.000) $ (13,093.000)
Delta Total $ (41,043.640) $ (19,501.714) $ (9,432.202)
Abatement
Delta Carbon (MTCO2) (380.860) (350.560) (335.580)
Carbon Intensity (pre-CESA) 0.6204 0.6204 0.6204
Carbon Intensity (CESA) 0.5365 0.5364 0.5359
Carbon Cost ($/TCO2) $ 107.77 $ 55.63 $ 28.11
Initial Price ($/MWh) $ 98.00 $ 98.00 $ 98.00
Equilibrium Price ($/MWh) $ 112.66 $ 105.28 $ 101.48
Shadow Value (lambda) ($/TCO2) $ 74.30 $ 43.27 $ 23.25
See Appendix B for calculation equations.
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Table 4: Elasticity Scenarios for 2035 Projected Data
2035
Elasticities Low Average High
High Carbon 0.95 1.9 3.8
Natural Gas 0.635 1.27 2.54
Zero Carbon 1.37 2.74 5.48
Generation (M MWh)
Delta High Carbon (1,215.000) (1,205.900) (1,200.900)
Delta Natural Gas 902.390 929.450 940.520
Delta Zero Carbon 193.390 214.570 230.060
Delta Total (119.270) (61.833) (30.271)
Surplus ($m)
Delta Producer $ (57,409.000) $ (27,326.000) $ (14,059.000)
Delta Consumer $ (55,993.000) $ (28,100.000) $ (13,517.000)
Delta Total $ (113,335.190) $ (55,349.377) $ (27,493.588)
Abatement
Delta Carbon (MTCO2) (867.340) (844.510) (833.850)
Carbon Intensity (pre-CESA) 0.6248 0.6248 0.6248
Carbon Intensity (CESA) 0.4186 0.4182 0.4176
Carbon Cost ($/TCO2) $ 130.67 $ 65.54 $ 32.97
Initial Price ($/MWh) $ 101.00 $ 101.00 $ 101.00
Equilibrium Price ($/MWh) $ 115.35 $ 108.15 $ 104.42
Shadow Value (lambda) ($/TCO2) $ 74.30 $ 43.27 $ 23.25
See Appendix B for calculation equations.
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Table 5: Elasticity Scenarios for 1992 Historical Data
1992
Elasticities Low Average High
High Carbon 0.95 1.9 3.8
Natural Gas 0.635 1.27 2.54
Zero Carbon 1.37 2.74 5.48
Generation (M MWh)
Delta High Carbon (10.794) (10.929) (11.011)
Delta Natural Gas 1.231 1.212 1.201
Delta Zero Carbon 9.994 9.961 9.941
Detal Total 0.432 0.245 0.131
Surplus ($m)
Delta Producer $ (202.620) $ (114.050) $ (60.744)
Delta Consumer $ 188.930 $ 107.210 $ 57.327
Delta Total $ (11.890) $ (5.044) $ (1.628)
Abatement
Delta Carbon (MTCO2) (10.962) (11.115) (11.209)
Carbon Intensity (pre-CESA) 0.8249 0.8249 0.8249
Carbon Intensity (CESA) 0.8200 0.8200 0.8200
Carbon Cost ($/TCO2) $ 1.08 $ 0.45 $ 0.15
Initial Price ($/MWh) $ 100.66 $ 100.66 $ 100.66
Equilibrium Price ($/MWh) $ 100.58 $ 100.61 $ 100.64
Shadow Value (lambda) ($/TCO2) $ 2.42 $ 1.21 $ 0.60
See Appendix B for calculation equations.
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Table 6: Elasticity Scenarios for 1992 Synthetic Data
1992 (Synthetic, High Carbon Intensity)
Elasticities Low Average High
High Carbon 0.95 1.9 3.8
Natural Gas 0.635 1.27 2.54
Zero Carbon 1.37 2.74 5.48
Generation (M MWh)
Delta High Carbon (169.440) (164.790) (163.390)
Delta Natural Gas 19.691 18.558 17.906
Delta Zero Carbon 142.400 144.290 144.990
Detal Total (7.348) (1.944) (0.497)
Surplus ($m)
Delta Producer $ (903.530) $ (1,131.400) $ (753.090)
Delta Consumer $ (3,240.600) $ (852.570) $ (217.810)
Delta Total $ (4,118.568) $ (1,958.028) $ (944.802)
Abatement
Delta Carbon (MTCO2) (171.900) (167.470) (166.280)
Carbon Intensity (pre-CESA) 0.9000 0.9000 0.9000
Carbon Intensity (CESA) 0.8200 0.8200 0.8200
Carbon Cost ($/TCO2) $ 23.96 $ 11.69 $ 5.68
Initial Price ($/MWh) $ 100.66 $ 100.66 $ 100.66
Equilibrium Price ($/MWh) $ 102.23 $ 101.07 $ 100.77
Shadow Value (lambda) ($/TCO2) $ 49.21 $ 23.11 $ 11.20
See Appendix B for calculation equations.
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Figure 1: The nuclear capacity additions since December 31, 1991. Approximately 98% of
current capacity is exempt from CESA-12.
Figure 2: The hydroelectric capacity additions since December 31, 1991. Approximately
93% of current capacity is exempt from CESA-12.
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B Data and Simulation Model Information
This section will outline the some of the speciﬁcs of the model as well as the reasons to
utilize certain data. The corresponding model variables can be found in the simulation
code in Appendix C.
Electricity Generation Information - 1992 data was taken from the Energy Information
Agency Annual Energy Outlook 1995 (EIA, 2005). Data from all other years was taken
from the Energy Information Agency Annual Energy Outlook 2012. Despite the fact that
approximately 19% of utilities would be exempt from the CESA-12 constraints, this paper
does not subtract that quantity from total generation to minimize data gathering eﬀorts.
Furthermore, this paper assumes that the exempted utilities have the same generation
distribution as the entire utility population.
Price Elasticities - All elasticities are taken as constant elasticity curves. The price
elasticity of demand is taken from Webster, et al. (2008), and is thought to be relatively
inelastic with a value of -0.23. The authors’ approach internalizes energy demand as a
function of income, rather than allowing technology drive energy demand. Price elastici-
ties of supply for electricity generation sources are not well documented in the academic
literature so elasticities for similar products are used in the model. To demonstrate model
robustness, elasticity values approximately double this value as well as half these values
were used. Beck, et al. (1991) estimate the long run Australian aggregate coal supply
elasticity to be 1.9. Huntington (1992) estimates the price elasticity for natural gas in the
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U.S. averages during the 2010 time period as 1.21. A working paper by Johnson empirically
ﬁnds that an appropriate supply elasticity for renewable electricity generation in the U.S.
is 2.74.
Subsidy - Subsidies exist for various types of renewable and clean energy generation
and are available on IRS Form 8835. Wind, closed-loop biomass, geothermal, and solar
installations each receive $22 per MWh produced. Open-loop biomass, small irrigation
power, trash, hydropower, and marine and hydrokinetic renewables each receive $11 per
MWh produced. A generation weighted estimation was calculated with data from Energy
Information Agency Annual Energy Outlook 2012 (EIA, 2012).
Carbon Factors - Factors taken from EIA form 860 for 2010, which contains generation
and emissions data for 2009. Annual CO2 production is divided by annual generation from
each fuel source. The high carbon energy source carbon factor is a generation weighted
average of coal and oil fueled plants.
Generation Distribution Assumptions - For 2015 and 2035 simulations, the carbon
intensity constraint alone is non-binding. Average levelized generation costs were used to
estimate the distribution of the clean generation required to replace retiring high carbon
plants. Using assumptions from the Annual Energy Outlook 2012 (EIA, 2012) clean energy
sources coming online in 2017 cost approximately $132.20 per MWh while natural gas
generation coming online in 2017 cost approximately $108.18 per MWh. Assuming the
same amount of money would be spent on both technologies, approximately 1.22 natural
gas MWhs are produced for each clean energy MWh. Natural gas generation still factors
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into carbon intensity requirements.
Synthetic Data - Data from 1992 was altered to create a more carbon-intense scenario
(EIA, 1995). Carbon factors, coal, and oil generation remain unchanged. Nuclear gener-
ation is exempted in the same manner as the 1992 historical data. Both natural gas and
renewable generation were arbitrarily reduced by one-third.
Production Cost Functional Form - The general production cost functional form is
constructed as follows:
ProdCost = Ci(qi) =
(Pelect) Ei 

Q
1
Ei+1
i

Q
1
Ei
i
(20)
Producer Surplus Functional Form - The producer surplus functional form is con-
structed as follows:
ProdSurplus = (PMWh QMWh)  (CH(qH)  CL(qL)CZ(qZ)) (21)
Consumer Surplus Functional Form - The consumer surplus functional form is con-
structed as follows:
ConsSurplus = PMWh 

1
QMWh
 1
Ed  11
Ed+1
Q
1
Ed+1
MWh   PMWh 

1
QMWh
 1
Ed (22)
Carbon Cost Functional Form - The carbon cost functional form is constructed as
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follows:
CarbonCost =
Surplus
CO2
=
ProdSurplus+ConsSurplus+Subsidy
CO2CESA 12   CO2REF
(23)
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C Simulation Code
% Notes: The model uses a constant elasticity MC and demand curves for
% all energy sources
% Prices are retail prices
% The simulation is set up to run all possible CESA values
%>= the carbon factor of NG and renewables
% Notation: RI - reference values (2010), S - supply, D - demand, E -
% elasticities, CF- Carbon factors
% Toggle denotes years with CESA generation requirements
clear; % Clear memory
% Set CESA standard
CESA = 0.82000; % Level of Clean Energy Standard Act
%(Used for "one-off" calc's)
% Input Variables
% Average Source Subsidy
Subsidy = [0.18]; % Dollars, generation weighted subsidy for
% biomass, hydro electric, hydrokinetic, wind,
% geothermal, waste to energy
% http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8835.pdf
% Energy Source Properties
CFhc = [1.0703159]; %Average production weighted high carbon energy
% source carbon factor (eGrid, 2009)
CFng = [0.48]; %High Natural Gas carbon factor MMTCO2e/MWh
CFcl = [0]; %Clean energy sources (as defined by CESA-12)
% Elasticities % Vary these for scenarios
%Nominal
Eelecd = [-0.23]; %Price elasticity of electricty demand (long-run)
Ehc = [1.90]; %Price elasticity of high carbon e source supply
Eng = [1.27]; %Price elasticity of ng supply
Ecl = [2.74]; %Price elasticity of clean energy supply
%Low
% Eelecd = [-0.23];
% Ehc = [0.95];
% Eng = [0.635];
% Ecl = [1.37];
% High
% Eelecd = [-0.23];
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% Ehc = [3.80];
% Eng = [2.54];
% Ecl = [5.48];
% Electricity Market Initial Equilibrium Prices,
% assumes all electricity produced is consumed
%1992 Reference Case
% Year = [1992];
% toggle=1;
% PelecRI = [100.66]; %Baseline/Reference US electricity
% production price per MWh in 2010
% real dollars (AEO 1997)
% ElecthcRI = [1665E+6]; %Baseline/Reference US electicity
% from high carbon sources
% (does not include CHP) (MWh)
% ElectngRI = [264E+6]; %Initial consumption of natural
% gas (does not include CHP) (MWh)
% ElectclRI = [995E+6 - 610E+6]; %Initial consumption of clean
% energy sources
% ElectRI = [ElecthcRI + ElectngRI + ElectclRI]; %Baseline/Reference US
% electricity
% consumption (minus
% nuclear) (MWh)
%1992(Synthetic) Reference Case
% Year = [1992.1];
% toggle=1;
% PelecRI = [100.66];
% ElecthcRI = [1665E+6];
% ElectngRI = [176E+6];
% ElectclRI = [843E+6 - 610E+6];
% ElectRI = [ElecthcRI + ElectngRI + ElectclRI];
%2015 Reference Case
% Year = [2015];
% toggle=2;
% Clean_req = [0.24]; %Minimum clean energy percentage
% PelecRI = [97.0]; %Baseline/Reference US electricity
%production price per MWh in
%2010 real dollars (AEO 2012)
% ElecthcRI = [1556E+6]; %Baseline/Reference US electicity
%from high carbon sources (does not
%include CHP) (MWh)
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% ElectngRI = [903E+6]; %Initial consumption of natural gas
%(does not include CHP) (MWh)
% ElectclRI = [873E+6]; %Initial consumption of clean energy sources
% ElectRI = [ElecthcRI + ElectngRI + ElectclRI]; %Baseline/Reference US
%electricity consumption (minus nuclear) (MWh)
%2025 Reference Case
% Year = [2025]
% toggle = 2;
% PelecRI = [97.0];
% Clean_req = [0.51];
% ElecthcRI = [1736E+6];
% ElectngRI = [884E+6];
% ElectclRI = [970E+6];
% ElectRI = [ElecthcRI + ElectngRI + ElectclRI];
%2030 Reference Case
% Year = [2030];
% toggle=2;
% Clean_req = [0.69];
% PelecRI = [98.0];
% ElecthcRI = [1748E+6];
% ElectngRI = [983E+6];
% ElectclRI = [1045E+6];
% ElectRI = [ElecthcRI + ElectngRI + ElectclRI];
%2035 Reference Case
% Year = [2035];
% toggle=2;
% Clean_req = [0.84];
% PelecRI = [101.0];
% ElecthcRI = [1830E+6];
% ElectngRI = [1078E+6];
% ElectclRI = [1055E+6];
% ElectRI = [ElecthcRI + ElectngRI + ElectclRI];
% Create and initialize internal variables
AFCF = 0; % Initialize AFCF to 0
Shc = ElecthcRI; % Initialize high carbon supply
Sng = ElectngRI; %Initialize natural gas supply
Scl = ElectclRI; %Initialize clean energy supply
Selec = ElectRI; % Initialize supply of MWhs
PMWh_upper = 500;
PMWh_lower = 0; % Set range for MWh price search
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PMWh = 100;
lambda_upper = 500;
lambda_lower = -500; % Set initial range lambda search (will reset below)
lambda = 0;
count1 = 0;
count2 = 0;
count3 = 0; % Counter variables
i = 1;
%____________________________________________________________________
% CESA Calculations
%____________________________________________________________________
%____________________________________________
%Pre-CESA Years
%____________________________________________
if toggle == 1
while count2 < 500;
% Search for lambda that causes AFCF to exceed CFng (used to get
% upper bound for lambda such that calculated AFCF does not exceed
% the FI of the EtOH (I'm unsure what this abbreviation means)
lambda_test = 1;
AFCF_test = 0;
while lambda_test <= 500
Shc = ElecthcRI*(((PMWh-lambda_test*(CFhc-CESA))/PelecRI)^(Ehc));
if Shc < 100
Shc = 0;
end
Sng = ElectngRI*(((PMWh-lambda_test*(CFng-CESA))/PelecRI)^(Eng));
Scl = ElectclRI*(((PMWh-lambda_test*(CFcl-CESA))/PelecRI)^(Ecl));
AFCF_test (1,lambda_test) = (CFhc*Shc + CFng*Sng + CFcl*Scl)/(Shc + Sng + Scl);
lambda_test = lambda_test + 1;
end
[C,I] = min(AFCF_test);
lambda_upper = I;
lambda_lower = -10;
% Now that lambda range defined search for lambda and P such that
% AFCF is met and energy market clears
while count1 < 500;
% Calculate supply of high and low carbon energy sources (constant elasticity curves)
Shc = ElecthcRI*(((PMWh-lambda*(CFhc-CESA))/PelecRI)^(Ehc));
if Shc < 10
Shc = 0;
end
Sng = ElectngRI*(((PMWh-lambda*(CFng-CESA))/PelecRI)^(Eng));
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Scl = ElectclRI*(((PMWh-lambda*(CFcl-CESA))/PelecRI)^(Ecl));
% Check for compliance with CESA standard
AFCF = (CFhc*Shc + CFng*Sng + CFcl*Scl)/(Shc + Sng + Scl);
% Set new bounds for lambda
if AFCF > CESA
lambda_lower = lambda;
end
if AFCF < CESA
lambda_upper = lambda;
end
count1 = count1 + 1;
lambda = (lambda_upper+lambda_lower)/2;
lambdamax1 = max(lambda);
end
count1 = 0;
% Calculate supply of MWh's
Selec = Shc + Sng + Scl;
% Market clearing for elect
Delecd = ElectRI*((PMWh/PelecRI)^Eelecd);
if Delecd > Selec
PMWh_lower = PMWh;
end
if Delecd < Selec
PMWh_upper = PMWh;
end
PMWh = (PMWh_lower+PMWh_upper)/2;
count2 = count2 + 1;
end
count2 = 0;
PMWh_upper = 500;
PMWh_lower = 0;
% Social welfare calculations
% Consumer Surplus
% Set lower bound for integral (so that integral is finite)
int_limit = (1/10)*ElectRI; % lower limit as a percentage of gge consumption
%in the unregulated market
CS_no_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectRI)^(1/Eelecd)*(1/(1/Eelecd+1))*ElectRI^(1/Eelecd+1)
- PelecRI*(1/ElectRI)^(1/Eelecd)*(1/(1/Eelecd+1))*int_limit^(1/Eelecd+1)
- (PelecRI*(ElectRI-int_limit))]; % Consumer surplus without the CESA
CS_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectRI)^(1/Eelecd)*(1/(1/Eelecd+1))*Delecd^(1/Eelecd+1)
- PelecRI*(1/ElectRI)^(1/Eelecd)*(1/(1/Eelecd+1))*int_limit^(1/Eelecd+1)
- (PMWh*(Delecd-int_limit))]; % Consumer surplus with the CESA
Delta_CS = CS_CESA - CS_no_CESA - int_limit*(PMWh-PelecRI);
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%change in consumer surplus as a result of CESA
%Production Costs
rev_no_CESA = (PelecRI)*ElectRI; % Producer revenue without CESA
rev_CESA = (PMWh)*Selec; % Producer revenue with CESA
C_ng_no_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectngRI)^(1/Eng)*(1/(1/Eng+1))*ElectngRI^(1/Eng+1)];
% Total cost of ng production without CESA
C_ng_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectngRI)^(1/Eng)*(1/(1/Eng+1))*Sng^(1/Eng+1)];
% Total cost of ng Production with CESA
C_hc_no_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElecthcRI)^(1/Ehc)*(1/(1/Ehc+1))*ElecthcRI^(1/Ehc+1)];
% Total cost of hc production without CESA
C_hc_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElecthcRI)^(1/Ehc)*(1/(1/Ehc+1))*Shc^(1/Ehc+1)];
% Total cost of hc production with CESA
C_cl_no_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectclRI)^(1/Ecl)*(1/(1/Ecl+1))*ElectclRI^(1/Ecl+1)];
% Total cost of cl production without CESA
C_cl_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectclRI)^(1/Ecl)*(1/(1/Ecl+1))*Scl^(1/Ecl+1)];
% Total cost of cl production with CESA
% Producer Surplus
PS_no_CESA = rev_no_CESA - (C_ng_no_CESA + C_hc_no_CESA + C_cl_no_CESA);
% Prod. surplus without CESA
PS_CESA = rev_CESA - (C_ng_CESA + C_hc_CESA + C_cl_CESA);
% Prod. surplus with CESA
Delta_PS = PS_CESA - PS_no_CESA;
% Change in prod. surplus as a result of CESA
% Individual Energy PS
% High Carbon
PS_no_CESA_hc = rev_no_CESA*(ElecthcRI/ElectRI)-C_hc_no_CESA;
PS_CESA_hc = rev_CESA*(Shc/Selec)-C_hc_CESA;
Delta_PS_hc = PS_CESA_hc - PS_no_CESA_hc;
% Fraction PS change attributed to high carbon energy sources
% Natural Gas
PS_no_CESA_ng = rev_no_CESA*(ElectngRI/ElectRI)-C_ng_no_CESA;
PS_CESA_ng = rev_CESA*(Sng/Selec)-C_ng_CESA;
Delta_PS_ng = PS_CESA_ng - PS_no_CESA_ng;
% Fraction PS change attributed to natural gas energy sources
% Clean Sources
PS_no_CESA_cl = rev_no_CESA*(ElectclRI/ElectRI)-C_cl_no_CESA;
PS_CESA_cl = rev_CESA*(Scl/Selec)-C_ng_CESA;
Delta_PS_cl = PS_CESA_cl - PS_no_CESA_cl;
% Fraction PS change attributed to clean energy sources
% Subsidy Cost
Subsidy_no_CESA = Subsidy*ElectclRI;
Subsidy_CESA = Subsidy*Scl;
Delta_Subsidy = Subsidy_CESA - Subsidy_no_CESA;
% Change in subsidy cost as a result of CESA
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Delta_Tot_Surplus = Delta_PS + Delta_CS + Delta_Subsidy;
% Carbon
Carb_no_CESA = (ElecthcRI)*CFhc + (ElectngRI)*CFng + (ElectclRI)*CFcl;
% CO2 eq. without CESA - Result here is MMTCO2e
Carb_no_CESA_hc = ElecthcRI*CFhc;
Carb_no_CESA_ng = ElectngRI*CFng;
Carb_no_CESA_cl = ElectclRI*CFcl;
Carb_CESA = (Shc)*CFhc + (Sng)*CFng +(Scl)*CFcl;
% CO2 eq. with CESA - Result here is MMTCO2e
Carb_CESA_hc = Shc*CFhc;
Carb_CESA_ng = Sng*CFng;
Carb_CESA_cl = Scl*CFcl;
Delta_Carb = Carb_CESA - Carb_no_CESA;
Delta_Carb_hc = Carb_CESA_hc - Carb_no_CESA_hc;
Delta_Carb_ng = Carb_CESA_ng - Carb_no_CESA_ng;
% Carb_Det
Carbon_Cost = (Delta_PS + Delta_CS)/(Carb_no_CESA - Carb_CESA);
% Cost of abatment change in (CS + PS)/abatement
% Generation allocation
Delta_Gen_hc_CESA = Shc - ElecthcRI;
Delta_Gen_ng_CESA = Sng - ElectngRI;
Delta_Gen_cl_CESA = Scl - ElectclRI;
Delta_Gen_tot_CESA = Selec - ElecthcRI - ElectngRI - ElectclRI;
CESA_Check = Scl/Selec;
CI_no_CESA = [(ElecthcRI*CFhc + ElectngRI*CFng + ElectclRI*CFcl)
/(ElecthcRI +ElectngRI + ElectclRI)];
CI_CESA = (Shc*CFhc + Sng*CFng + Scl*CFcl)/(Shc + Sng + Scl);
% Output to .csv File
OUTPUT = [
Year;
Ehc;
Eng;
Ecl;
Delta_Gen_hc_CESA;
Delta_Gen_ng_CESA;
Delta_Gen_cl_CESA;
Delta_Gen_tot_CESA;
CI_no_CESA;
CI_CESA;
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Delta_PS;
Delta_CS;
Delta_Tot_Surplus;
PMWh;
Delta_Subsidy;
lambda;
toggle;
Carbon_Cost;
Delta_Carb;
];
dlmwrite(['/Users/lauderbaugh/Documents/MATLAB/CESA-12/SimulationOutput.txt',
OUTPUT, 'delimiter', ',']);
end
%____________________________________________
%CESA Years
%____________________________________________
if toggle == 2
%Coerce generation to meet generation percentage requirement
while ((Sng+Scl)/(Shc+Sng+Scl) < Clean_req);
count3 = count3+1;
while count2 < 500 && count3 ==1;
if count3 == 1;
while count1 < 500;
% Calculate supply of high and low carbon energy sources
%(constant elasticity curves)
Shc = ElecthcRI*(((PMWh-lambda*(CFhc-CESA))/PelecRI)^(Ehc));
if Shc < 10
Shc = 0;
end
Sng = ElectngRI*(((PMWh-lambda*(CFng-CESA))/PelecRI)^(Eng));
Scl = ElectclRI*(((PMWh-lambda*(CFcl-CESA))/PelecRI)^(Ecl));
% Check for compliance with CESA standard
AFCF = (CFhc*Shc + CFng*Sng + CFcl*Scl)/(Shc + Sng + Scl);
% Set new bounds for lambda
if AFCF > CESA
lambda_lower = lambda;
end
if AFCF < CESA
lambda_upper = lambda;
end
count1 = count1 + 1;
lambda = (lambda_upper+lambda_lower)/2;
lambdamax1 = max(lambda);
end
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count1 = 0;
% Calculate supply of MWh's
Selec = Shc + Sng + Scl;
% Market clearing for elect
Delecd = ElectRI*((PMWh/PelecRI)^Eelecd);
if Delecd > Selec
PMWh_lower = PMWh;
end
if Delecd < Selec
PMWh_upper = PMWh;
end
PMWh = (PMWh_lower+PMWh_upper)/2;
count2 = count2 + 1;
end
end
count2 = 0;
PMWh_upper = 500;
PMWh_lower = 0;
%Coerce generation
if (Sng+Scl)/(Shc+Sng+Scl) < Clean_req
addition = 100000;
Scl = Scl + (addition*.45);
Sng = Sng + (addition*.55);
Shc = Shc - (addition);
end
end
% Social welfare calculations
% Consumer Surplus
% Set lower bound for integral (so that integral is finite)
int_limit = (1/10)*ElectRI; % lower limit as a percentage of gge consumption
%in the unregulated market
CS_no_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectRI)^(1/Eelecd)*(1/(1/Eelecd+1))*ElectRI^(1/Eelecd+1)
- PelecRI*(1/ElectRI)^(1/Eelecd)*(1/(1/Eelecd+1))*int_limit^(1/Eelecd+1)
- (PelecRI*(ElectRI-int_limit))]; % Consumer surplus without the CESA
CS_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectRI)^(1/Eelecd)*(1/(1/Eelecd+1))*Delecd^(1/Eelecd+1)
- PelecRI*(1/ElectRI)^(1/Eelecd)*(1/(1/Eelecd+1))*int_limit^(1/Eelecd+1)
- (PMWh*(Delecd-int_limit))]; % Consumer surplus with the CESA
Delta_CS = CS_CESA - CS_no_CESA - int_limit*(PMWh-PelecRI);
%change in consumer surplus as a result of CESA
%Production Costs
rev_no_CESA = (PelecRI)*ElectRI; % Producer revenue without CESA
rev_CESA = (PMWh)*Selec; % Producer revenue with CESA
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C_ng_no_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectngRI)^(1/Eng)*(1/(1/Eng+1))*ElectngRI^(1/Eng+1)];
% Total cost of ng production without CESA
C_ng_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectngRI)^(1/Eng)*(1/(1/Eng+1))*Sng^(1/Eng+1)];
% Total cost of ng Production with CESA
C_hc_no_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElecthcRI)^(1/Ehc)*(1/(1/Ehc+1))*ElecthcRI^(1/Ehc+1)];
% Total cost of hc production without CESA
C_hc_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElecthcRI)^(1/Ehc)*(1/(1/Ehc+1))*Shc^(1/Ehc+1)];
% Total cost of hc production with CESA
C_cl_no_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectclRI)^(1/Ecl)*(1/(1/Ecl+1))*ElectclRI^(1/Ecl+1)];
% Total cost of cl production without CESA
C_cl_CESA = [PelecRI*(1/ElectclRI)^(1/Ecl)*(1/(1/Ecl+1))*Scl^(1/Ecl+1)];
% Total cost of cl production with CESA
% Producer Surplus
PS_no_CESA = rev_no_CESA - (C_ng_no_CESA + C_hc_no_CESA + C_cl_no_CESA);
% Prod. surplus without CESA
PS_CESA = rev_CESA - (C_ng_CESA + C_hc_CESA + C_cl_CESA);
% Prod. surplus with CESA
Delta_PS = PS_CESA - PS_no_CESA;
% Change in prod. surplus as a result of CESA
% Individual Energy PS
% High Carbon
PS_no_CESA_hc = rev_no_CESA*(ElecthcRI/ElectRI)-C_hc_no_CESA;
PS_CESA_hc = rev_CESA*(Shc/Selec)-C_hc_CESA;
Delta_PS_hc = PS_CESA_hc - PS_no_CESA_hc;
% Fraction PS change attributed to high carbon energy sources
% Natural Gas
PS_no_CESA_ng = rev_no_CESA*(ElectngRI/ElectRI)-C_ng_no_CESA;
PS_CESA_ng = rev_CESA*(Sng/Selec)-C_ng_CESA;
Delta_PS_ng = PS_CESA_ng - PS_no_CESA_ng;
% Fraction PS change attributed to natural gas energy sources
% Clean Sources
PS_no_CESA_cl = rev_no_CESA*(ElectclRI/ElectRI)-C_cl_no_CESA;
PS_CESA_cl = rev_CESA*(Scl/Selec)-C_ng_CESA;
Delta_PS_cl = PS_CESA_cl - PS_no_CESA_cl;
% Fraction PS change attributed to clean energy sources
% Subsidy Cost
Subsidy_no_CESA = Subsidy*ElectclRI;
Subsidy_CESA = Subsidy*Scl;
Delta_Subsidy = Subsidy_CESA - Subsidy_no_CESA;
% Change in subsidy cost as a result of CESA
Delta_Tot_Surplus = Delta_PS + Delta_CS + Delta_Subsidy;
% Carbon
Carb_no_CESA = (ElecthcRI)*CFhc + (ElectngRI)*CFng + (ElectclRI)*CFcl;
% CO2 eq. without CESA - Result here is MMTCO2e
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Carb_no_CESA_hc = ElecthcRI*CFhc;
Carb_no_CESA_ng = ElectngRI*CFng;
Carb_no_CESA_cl = ElectclRI*CFcl;
Carb_CESA = (Shc)*CFhc + (Sng)*CFng +(Scl)*CFcl;
% CO2 eq. with CESA - Result here is MMTCO2e
Carb_CESA_hc = Shc*CFhc;
Carb_CESA_ng = Sng*CFng;
Carb_CESA_cl = Scl*CFcl;
Delta_Carb = Carb_CESA - Carb_no_CESA;
Delta_Carb_hc = Carb_CESA_hc - Carb_no_CESA_hc;
Delta_Carb_ng = Carb_CESA_ng - Carb_no_CESA_ng;
% Carb_Det
Carbon_Cost = (Delta_PS + Delta_CS)/(Carb_no_CESA - Carb_CESA);
% Cost of abatment change in (CS + PS)/abatement
% Generation allocation
Delta_Gen_hc_CESA = Shc - ElecthcRI;
Delta_Gen_ng_CESA = Sng - ElectngRI;
Delta_Gen_cl_CESA = Scl - ElectclRI;
Delta_Gen_tot_CESA = Selec - ElecthcRI - ElectngRI - ElectclRI;
CESA_Check = Scl/Selec;
CI_no_CESA = [(ElecthcRI*CFhc + ElectngRI*CFng + ElectclRI*CFcl)
/(ElecthcRI +ElectngRI + ElectclRI)];
CI_CESA = (Shc*CFhc + Sng*CFng + Scl*CFcl)/(Shc + Sng + Scl);
% Output to .csv File
OUTPUT = [
Year;
Ehc;
Eng;
Ecl;
Delta_Gen_hc_CESA;
Delta_Gen_ng_CESA;
Delta_Gen_cl_CESA;
Delta_Gen_tot_CESA;
CI_no_CESA;
CI_CESA;
Delta_PS;
Delta_CS;
Delta_Tot_Surplus;
PMWh;
Delta_Subsidy;
lambda;
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toggle;
Carbon_Cost;
Delta_Carb;
];
dlmwrite(['/Users/lauderbaugh/Documents/MATLAB/CESA-12/SimulationOutput.txt',
OUTPUT, 'delimiter', ',']);
end
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